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I. INTRODUCTION
Louisiana's first constitution, adopted upon statehood in 1812,
did not address borrowing of funds or management of state property.
As in many other states, Louisiana's constitutional limits on
borrowing and curbs on subsidies to private interests resulted from
the Panic of 1837 and the depression that followed. New York had
set the pattern for state use of its credit to finance internal
improvements with the construction of the Erie Canal in 1817. Its
success led to substantial state borrowing to finance canals, then
railroads and other projects, fueled in large part by foreign capital.'
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States were soon overextended, and nine states defaulted on bonds
from 1841-42.2 State constitutions attempted to stop the resulting
financial chaos and to limit issuance of bonds by states, and then
later, by local governments. These prohibitions have continued in
various forms in many states. Few have attained their objectives of
financial stability. A leading commentator concludes,
Since 1900, however, states have developed means of
borrowing for public improvements that escape
constitutional bans. Courts in constitutionally restricted
states have ruled that constitutional prohibitions do not
apply to debts created through specific types of debt
instruments. This development has been so complete that
most states are now able to borrow funds in any amount for
nearly any purpose.3
It is ironic that over the past few decades, courts have tended to
construe limits on government action more broadly in the area of
individual rights, "while at the same time reading the bars against
government's allocation of public financial resources in aid of
private businesses more and more narrowly."4
In Louisiana, the limitations on borrowing and on subsidies
appeared in the state's second constitution, adopted in 1845.
Adoption of the these and other anti-business limitations was also
influenced by Anglo-Saxon Jacksonian Democrats melting into the
existing conservative Creole-French society. As historian Roger W.
Shugg put it, "The Panic of 1837 bred in them a lasting distrust of
the ways of finance; it left a heavy state debt and ruined many
banks. So they limited the legislative right to borrow money,
prohibited public loans to internal improvement companies, banned
the charter of banks, and restricted the life of all corporations to
twenty-five years. '
The state had engaged in substantial borrowing during the 1830s.
"Most of the available capital went into a new kind of government
loan-the internal improvement projects guaranteed by the credit of
the individual states."6 As Charles Gayarre put it, "At the beginning
2. A. James Heins, Constitutional Restrictions Against State Debt vi (1963).
3. Id. at v.
4. Ralph L. Finlayson, State Constitutional Prohibitions Against Use of
Public Financial Resources in Aid of Private Enterprises, 1 Emerging Issues in
State Constitutional Law 177, 198 (1988). See also Charles W. Goldner, Jr., State
and Local Government Fiscal Responsibility: An Integrated Approach, 26 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 925 (1991).
5. Roger W. Shugg, Origins ofClass Struggle in Louisiana 134 (2d ed. 1966).
See also id. at 125-26.
6. Richard H. Kilbourne, Jr., Louisiana Commercial Law: The Antebellum
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of the year 1839 the State owed to the Banks $75,000; at the
beginning of 1841 the debt amounted to $850,000; and it was
generally believed at the time, on the authority of persons who had
made the calculation, that the members of the Legislature, in their
private capacity, owed to those institutions about one million
dollars."7 In addition, the state had issued bonds to subscribe to the
capital stock of several banks. In 1824, it chartered the Bank of
Louisiana, investing $2 million to obtain half of its stock., The debt
of the state's banks in 1838 was $22,950,000. 9 By 1842, Louisiana
had issued $24,450,000 of bonds on behalf of banks."0 In 1843, the
state defaulted on $1.273 million in state bonds." When the price of
cotton fell, repayment of foreign capital was difficult. Bank
"depositors and note holders alike rushed for their specie, and the
banks were forced to suspend."' 2 During the debates on the 1845
Constitution, Judah P. Benjamin stated that only five banks in the
state survived the depression of 1837.' 3
The response in the 1845 Constitution was draconian; among its
provisions were:
(1) The state shall not subscribe to the stock of any
corporation or joint stock company.' 4
(2) The legislature shall not pledge the faith of the State for
the payment of any bonds, bills, or other contracts or
obligations for the benefit or use of any person or persons,
corporation, or body-politic whatever."
(3) Aggregate state debt shall not exceed $100,000.16
Period 160 (Law Center Publications Inst. of the LSU Law Center 1980).
7. 4 Charles Gayarre, History of Louisiana 660 (1885). He also stated, "This
simple statement suffices to show the danger of increasing too much the facilities
of borrowing."
8. Caldwell, supra note 1, at 45-46.
9. Heins, supra note 2, at 6.
10. Caldwell, supra note 1, at 102. Since some of the bonds were not yet sold,
total debt on behalf of banks was $18,250,000.
11. Judith K. Schafer, Reform or Experiment? The Louisiana Constitution of
1845, in In Search of Fundamental Law: Louisiana's Constitutions, 1812-1974, at
35 (Warren M. Billings & Edward F. Haas eds., 1993).
12. Caldwell, supra note 1, at 55.
13. Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of Louisiana, New Orleans,
1845, at 861 (Robert J. Ker, Reporter; 1845); see 1 Alden L. Powell, A History of
Louisiana Constitutions, Part 1, Projet of a Constitution for the State of Louisiana
with Notes and Studies 233, 330-37 (1954).
14. La. Const. art. 121 (1845).
15. La. Const. art. 113 (1845). The article made an exception allowing new
bonds to refmance existing debts, but in no greater amounts and at no higher
interest rate.
16. La. Const. art. 114 (1845). Exceptions included (1) sums raised in case of
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(4) No corporate body shall be hereafter created, renewed,
or extended with banking or discounting privileges. 7
The extent of these constitutional curbs produced a counter
reaction. New Orleans commercial and financial interests were
dissatisfied with these limits on commerce and growth as the city's
trade was shifting to Savannah and Charleston." The Whigs
captured political power and called the Constitutional Convention
of 1852. Roger W. Shugg typically overstates the point, "Under the
efficient leadership of Judah P. Benjamin they proceeded first to
grant the commercial interests everything they wanted and then to
make changes in representation that might perpetuate the power of
Whiggery."' 9 It was called a speculator's convention: "Limitation
of the state's capacity to borrow money was wiped out; public
subscriptions to internal improvement companies were authorized;
and the General Assembly was empowered to charter conservative,
specie-paying banks by special or general laws."20
Foreshadowing future developments that led to longer and more
detailed constitutional provisions, the changes in the 1852
Constitution were not simple ones. The drafters did not take the
clear and easy approach of removing the old provisions in their
entirety and returning to the language of the 1812 document.
Exceptions and complications in existing provisions were adopted
instead. The 1852 document provided:
(1) The state could not subscribe to the stock of a
corporation EXCEPT to companies organized to make
internal improvements up to 1/5 of the capital of the
company. 21
(2) The state could not make a loan to, nor pledge its faith
for the benefit of any corporation or joint stock companies
EXCEPT to aid companies making internal improvements
up to 1/5 of the capital of the company 22
(3) Aggregate state debt could not exceed $100,00023
war, to repel invasions or suppress insurrections; (2) sums authorized by law for
a single object or work, which law must provide for taxation to discharge the debt.
17. La. Const. art. 122 (1845).
18. Caldwell, supra note 1, at 82-89.
19. Shugg, supra note ?, at 136.
20. Id. at 137; Wayne M. Everard, Louisiana's "Whig" Constitution Revisited:
The Constitution of 1852, in In Search of Fundamental Law: Louisiana's
Constitutions, 1812-1974, at 38 (Warren M. Billings & Edward F. Haas eds.,
1993); Caldwell, supra note 1, at 84.
21. La. Const. arts. 108, 109 (1852).
22. Id.
23. La. Const. art. 111 (1852).
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(4) The state could charter banks, but could not subscribe to the
stock of banking corporations.24
State largesse to private interests immediately increased in the
Whig-dominated legislative session of 1853. As Alden Powell's
history states,
The State bought forty-eight thousand shares of stock in the
New Orleans, Opelousas and Great Western Railroad
Company, for which it paid one million, two hundred thousand
dollars; spent one million, six hundred thousand dollars for
sixty-four thousand shares of stock in the New Orleans,
Jackson, and Great Northern Railroad Company; purchased
thirty-two thousand shares in the Vicksburg, Shreveport, and
Texas Railroad Company for eight hundred thousand dollars;
and gave fifty thousand dollars for two thousand shares in the
Grosse Tete and Baton Rouge Plank Road Company.25
State aid to private interests increased further under the carpetbag
government after adoption of the 1868 Constitution. Shugg's
observations are typical, "Whether it was the creation of a new parish
like Grant, for exploitation by carpetbaggers as notorious as the
Twitchells, or the issue of railway, land, and improvement bonds, the
telltale mark of fraud was upon each law. 26
In any event, the reaction to the excesses of Reconstruction
followed and subsequent constitutions would continue some sort of
limitation on the use of the state's credit and on subsidies to
developers, as well as attempts to prohibit corrupt transfers of state
property. Remnants of these provisions remain in the 1975
Constitution. The purpose of this essay is to look at the modem
limitations in their historical context and to analyze their effectiveness.
This review will show that the provisions have not been especially
successful. They are more the political fodder of editorial writers and
legislative auditors than workable legal standards that can be
effectively applied by courts.
The 1975 Constitution did not contain the dollar limits on total
bonds issued, but other current provisions can be traced back to the
language of the. 1845 and 1852 constitutions, particularly:
(1) Neither the state nor a political subdivision shall subscribe
to or purchase the stock of a corporation or association or for
any private enterprise.27
24. La. Const. arts. 108, 109 (1852).
25. Powell, supra note 13, at 233, 349.
26. Shugg, supra note ?, at 226.
.27. La. Const. art. VII, § 14(A).
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(2) Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the
funds, credit, property, or things of value of the state or of
any political subdivision shall not be loaned, pledged, or
donated to or for any person, association, or corporation,
public or private.2" But exceptions are made for (1) social
welfare programs; (2) employee pension and insurance
programs; (3) bonds to meet public obligations as provided
by law.
Behind these provisions are two basic policies. One is the
protection of the state's fiscal stability-by avoiding investment in
risky enterprises and avoiding issuance of bonds to finance
speculative ventures that endanger the state's ability to fund current
expenses and pay future debts. Another goal is prevention of
corruption by insiders who would use state property and credit to
benefit themselves, their friends and their supporters.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973
The records of the Constitutional Convention of 1973 ("CC'73")
do not exhibit a strong political or policy debate that might give a
clear guide to interpreting the limitations. The floor debate on the
issue takes up only six pages in the published transcripts, and the
technical provision that was adopted, one that made little change,
passed by a 91-1 vote.29
The CC '73 Committee on Revenue, Finance and Taxation had
to focus on numerous controversial political and policy problems,
including income and ad valorem taxation, homestead exemptions,
sales tax exemptions and supermajority votes for tax increases.3"
Given the time constraints, it did not devote substantial attention to
the problem of donating state property or using state credit for
private interests. To the extent the committee dealt with problems
and basic policies in this area, its concern was with the difficulty
under the 1921 Constitution to secure funding for desirable
programs, especially those related to social welfare and those
benefitting from federal matching funds. Numerous constitutional
amendments had been required to establish exceptions to the
general prohibition in the previous constitution, and the
committee's main policy initiative was to provide more legislative
flexibility.
28. Id.
29. IX Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973:
Convention Transcripts at 2896-2901 (Dec. 17, 1973).




The result was a relatively simple proposal. Committee
Proposal 15, Section 16(A) first stated the general rule of the 1921
Constitution3l with little change:
(A) The funds, credit, property or things of value of the state,
or of any political corporation thereof, shall not be loaned,
pledged, or donated to or for any person or persons,
associations or corporations, public or private, nor shall the
state nor any political corporation purchase or subscribe to the
capital stock or stock of any corporation or association
whatever or for any private enterprise.32
However, new language was proposed in Section (B) to provide an
exception to Section A that would grant more freedom to
governmental entities:
(B) Nothing contained in this Section shall prevent
intercooperation between the state and its political
corporations or between political corporations, or between the
state or its political corporations and the United States, or
between the state or its political corporations and any public
or private association or corporation or individual for a
public purpose. 33
On its face, Section (B) allowed agreements with private interests for
any public purpose and thus substantially relaxed the limitation in
Section 16(A). The committee comments suggested as much:
It is the intention of this Section to allow the loan, pledge,
or donation of property of the state or its political
corporations only for public purposes. This Section
represents a change in substance of the source provision,
which prohibited any funds, credit, property or things of value
of the state or its political corporations to be loaned, pledged
or donated to any person for any purpose excluding certain
exceptions contained within the source provision. Under this
Section the term "public purpose" is left to interpretation by
the judiciary so that there is sufficient flexibility for a lasting
and workable document.34
31. La. Const. art. 4, § 12 (1921). The Louisiana State Law Institute projet
took a similar approach in its general statement. See Art. IV, § 11(A), v. 1, at 22;
v. 2, at 362.
32. IV Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973:
Convention Instruments at 160.
33. Id.
34. I Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Journal of
Proceedings at 130 (July 6, 1973).
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When the proposal reached the convention floor, it was
acknowledged by the committee's representative that opposition had
developed to the proposal from members of the Committee on Local
and Parochial Government." No vote was taken on the Revenue
committee proposal. Debate instead centered on an amendment
proposed by the chairman of the local government committee, Chalin
0. Perez, which substituted language that had been developed in the
Local and Parochial Government committee. The objections, which
were more technical than substantive, centered on adoption of explicit
exceptions to the general rule and language to guarantee the security
of bonds that would be issued.
Section (A) of the amendment restated the general rule,
introduced by an exception clause:
(A) Except as otherwise provided in this constitution, the
funds, credit, property or things of value of the state, or of any
political subdivision thereof, shall not be loaned, pledged, or
donated to or for any person or persons, associations or
corporation, public or private, nor shall the state nor any
political subdivision purchase or subscribe to the capital stock
or stock of any corporation or association whatever or for any
private enterprise.
Section (B), containing exceptions to the rule of Section A, was more
detailed than the committee proposal. Perez explained
the extreme importance of this particular article. There are
over two hundred pages in our present constitution as a result
of what you would look at as Section (A)... because it is a
prohibition and rightfully so against the funds, credit,
property or things of value of the state from being loaned,
pledged or donated. But when you get yourself into that
position, then you have to make exceptions because of the
fact that you could never issue a bond unless you made an
exception for that purpose, and you could never have public
welfare. You couldn't have your retirement benefits. You
could not have intergovernmental cooperation. 6
The proposed Section (B) contained five exceptions to the general
rule to permit:
(1) intercooperation among agencies and private associations
for a public purpose;
35. IX Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973:




(2) programs of social welfare and aid to the needy;
(3) contributions to pension and insurance programs for
public employees;
(4) legislation allowing spending for a public purpose
approved by a 2/3 vote of the legislature; and
(5) pledge of the state's credit with respect to issuance of
bonds.
Apparently sensing the sentiment of the chamber, Perez removed
Section (B)(4) from the proposal, the most far reaching exception
which would have allowed substantially more legislative power to be
exercised.
Delegate Jack Avant then objected to the breadth of the exception
in Section (B)(1). His amendment, which was adopted, moved the
reference to intergovernmental cooperation to a separate section so
that it would not be an exception to Section (A). He explained that
he did not object to cooperative ventures in general, but did not want
to let them defeat the rule of Section (A):
That is the purpose of the amendment. In other words, this
intercooperation would be acceptable and permissible and
legal and fine, but you still can't under the guise of
cooperation do what the constitution has set out to prohibit,
and that is: take public funds and give them or loan them or
otherwise dispose of them to private entities."
Thus, the general approach of the prior constitution remains in the
new constitution, and the principles developed under the previous
provisions remain relevant. Still open are the issues of what it means
to make a donation and what it means to pledge the state's credit.
Also relevant is the inquiry into which state and local agencies are
limited by the rule. A third level of inquiry must focus on the scope
of the exceptions provided in Section (B), the list of which is growing
in light of subsequent amendments." All of these issues arise in a
rather generalized policy environment to which CC '73 added little
new information or authority.
37. Id. at 2900.
38. Amendments to the 1975 Constitution added to the list of exceptions.
They include: (4) return of property acquired by expropriation if no longer needed;
(5) higher education institutions can acquire stock in exchange for intellectual
property; (6) donation of blighted housing to tax-exempt organizations; (7) & (8)
deduction of tax liens on blighted property; (8) investment in stock by wildlife
refuge funds; (9) exchange of surplus movables by law enforcement units; (10)
donation of used asphalt.
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Ili. STOCK PURCHASES AND BUSINESS INVESTMENT
Neither the state nor apolitical subdivision shall subscribe
to or purchase the stock of a corporation or association or for
any private enterprise.
The limits on state investment in private companies can be traced
to the 1845 provision that prohibited the state from becoming a
"subscriber to the stock of any corporation or joint-stock company."39
The constitutions of 1852 and 1864 were more generous, allowing state
investments in companies making internal improvements, up to 1/5 of
the capital of each company.' The absolute prohibition reappeared in
the 1879 Constitution and was expanded to apply to local
governments.4 1 The provision has remained in all subsequent
constitutions. 2
By its terms, the limitation extends to providing initial capital to a
corporation by subscribing to an issue of stock, as well as purchase of
shares in existing corporations, either from shareholders or from the
corporation. The underlying policy, in light of the history of the
provision as discussed earlier, is to prevent the state from risking its
public funds in shaky or unwise ventures. In addition, the history also
suggests an anti-corruption policy to prevent dumping worthless stock
on the state or local governments by intimates of persons in power.
Ostensibly, the basic provision could be stretched to prevent state
retirement system funds from being invested in stocks, limiting the
pension plans to more modest returns available from more conservative
investments. However, the 1975 Constitution contains an exception in
Article VII, Section 14(B) that exempts from the limits of Section
14(A) state "contributions of public funds to pension and insurance
programs for the benefit of public employees." Even if it were
concluded that this text in the exception only applies to the
contribution of state funds to the systems and does not address the
investments that can be made by the systems, the courts developed an
exception for retirement system funds that allowed them to be invested
in stocks.
39. La. Const. art. 121 (1845).
40. La. Const. arts. 109, 112 (1852).
41. La. Const. art. 56 (1879).
42. La. Const. art. 58 (1898); La. Const. art. 58 (1913); La. Const. art. IV, §
12 (1921); La. Const. art. VII, § 14 (1975). Most recently, the voters approved
adoption of the amendment proposed by 1999 La. Acts No. 1402, which restates
the text, "Except as otherwise provided in this Section, neither the state nor a
political subdivision shall subscribe to or purchase the stock of a corporation or
association or for any private enterprise." Then, it adds in Section B an exception
that allows investments in stocks by two stated wildlife refuge trust funds.
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An overly simplistic 1980 opinion by the Attorney General had
relied on Section 14 in stating that the funds could not be invested in
stocks. 3 On request for a declaratory judgment by the state's
retirement fund boards, the district court disagreed with the Attorney
General under two theories-(1) the boards were not the state nor the
political subdivisions of the state limited by the constitutional
provision; (2) the funds contributed by the state and by employees,
once transferred to the retirement systems, were not public or state
funds and thus were not within the prohibition. The court of appeal in
La. State Employees'Retirement System v. State," affirmed the lower
court and held that it was permissible for retirement systems to invest
in corporate stock.
The first analysis is the simplest, resting on a textual analysis of
Section 14 which limits the state qua state and, does not apply to
agencies created under state law to act as trustees of retirement funds.
That construction accords with the terminology of Article XII, Section
10 which distinguishes among the state, a state agency, and apolitical
subdivision of the state." The result in the case is also supported by the
policies reflected in Section B(2) that the state can make contributions
of public funds to pension programs and its implication that the funds
become subject to management by those systems instead of being
managed by the state treasurer.
The second analysis would read into the second sentence of Section
14(A) the reference in the first sentence to public funds and public
property. It would follow that once the funds are transferred to the
trustees, the funds cease to be covered public funds or public property.
The court stated "that the constitutional aim was to prohibit the use of
public/state funds for private investment, but that funds belonging to
these retirement systems are not public/state funds as contemplated by
Article 7, Section 14(A).... "46
Constitutional amendments in 1987 to Article X, Section 29 further
reinforce the decision to allow the retirement systems to invest in
stock.47 In an attempt to move the retirement systems toward actuarial
soundness, a plan was adopted to force the legislature to transfer
additional funds to the systems. Part of that amendment, now E(5),
provides that assets of the system "shall be... invested as authorized
by law."'48 By law, the legislature allows investment in stocks.
43. 80 Op. Att'y Gen. 1049 (1980).
44. 423 So. 2d 73 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982), writs denied, 427 So. 2d 1206(1983). The West Virginia Supreme Court declined to follow the case in State ex.
re. Gaines v. West Virginia Bd. of Investments, 459 S.E.2d 531 (W. Va. 1995).
45. This argument is discussed further in infra Part II of this article.
46. 423 So. 2d at 75.
47. Amended Acts 1987, No. 947, effective Dec. 24, 1987.
48. La. R.S. 11:263 (1993), 267 (1994), 517 (1991).
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i Though the result in the case of retirement systems seems clear,
it nonetheless does put the state at some risk if poor investments are
made by the retirement system boards. By virtue of the provisions of
Article X, Section 29(A), even if the retirement system is structured
through independent entities, "the state shall guarantee benefits
payable to a member or retiree .'. . ." Here, it is the state qua state
that must guarantee the benefits. Also, that same provision also states
that membership in a retirement system shall be a "contractual
relationship between employee and employer," in the sense that state
action changing the terms of the retirement benefits plans would be
a violation of the contracts clause.49
Presumably, the state's interests are protected by the legislative
power and oversight that is available, both in terms of types of
investments permitted by law and in terms of the composition of the
boards and agencies that govern the retirement systems. Also,
investment in equities has the benefit of producing higher investment
yields and relieving the state of coming forward with funds to fulfill
its guarantees.5 0Outside the stock purchases context, the 1961 case of Public
Housing Administration v. Housing Authority of Bogalusa5" seems
hard to justify since it involved neither the possibility of corruption
nor of risky public investments. In that case, a local housing
authority was bound by federal contract to insure its properties with
the lowest bidder. Of two bids, the lower was from a mutual
insurance company which provided coverage for a premium and, in
addition, provided that the insured would share in the company's
profits so as to reduce the cost of insurance. The court adopted the
minority view in the United States and held this "investment" in a
49. Lee Hargrave, "Statutory" and "Hortatory" Provisions of the Louisiana
Constitution of1974, 43 La. L. Rev. 647,673 (1983); Lee Hargrave, The Louisiana
State Constitution: A Reference Guide 181 (1991) [hereinafter Hargrave, Louisiana
State Constitution].
50. UnfundedLiability ofSystems Down, Baton Rouge Advocate, Oct. 4, 1999,
at 8B; ("A recent preliminary report on the financial status of the state's three
retirement systems contained some good news for a change. The report showed the
unfunded accrued liability of the systems has been reduced by more than 25
percent by better-than-expected earnings from the stock market."); Bill McMahon,
La. Retirement System Thriving in Bullish Market, Baton Rouge State Times, Jan.
26, 1987, at 12A ("During a bullish stock market, Louisiana's retirement system for
state employees has been guided by money managers keen on common stock. The
retirement system has also seen its earnings multiply under professional guidance.
The system earned 11.9 percent on $1.7 billion in investments at the end of the last
fiscal year, June 30, 1986, said Vernon Strickland, director of the State Employees
Retirement System. More than a dozen years ago, the yield was just 6.9 percent
on $322 million in investments, before the system turned to professional money
managers to handle much of its money, Strickland said.").
51. 242 La. 519, 137 So. 2d 315 (La. 1961).
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mutual company was a contribution to capital of a private company
in violation of the constitution. The case was discussed in passing
during CC '73, but the issue was not addressed as being too minor
a point for a constitutional provision. 2 The case has not been
explicitly overruled, but was distinguished in Louisiana State
Employees'Retirement System v. State.3 The attorney general has
also issued an opinion allowing the purchase of insurance from
mutual companies under the language of the 1975 constitutional
provision.5 4
Given the caselaw discussed above, it would appear that
investments of what would otherwise be state funds can be made in
corporate stock if the funds are transferred to private entities in trust
for specific purposes. For example, the state matches private
donations to endow chairs and professorships at state and private
universities; these funds are transferred to private foundations and
invested by them. They are able to invest in stocks by virtue of the
principles just discussed."
Conversely, a number of (semi) trust funds have been
established within the state treasury that remain subject to the to the
treasurer's control. These monies would be state funds managed by
the state and subject to the prohibition of stock investment. In
typical Louisiana tendency for detail to breed detail, the constitution
has been amended to create the funds and to specify in the
amendments that the funds, or a part of them, may be invested in
stocks.56
Another area in which private trusts could probably have been
used to invest money, as in the case of pension systems, was state
universities entering into agreements with private entities to license
patent rights and otherwise profit from the intellectual property
52. IX Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Cofivention of 1973:
Convention Transcripts at 2898 (Dec. 17, 1973).
53. 423 So. 2d 73 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982), writs denied, 427 So. 2d 1206
(1983) (The housing authority fiuds were public funds, but contributions made by
state and by state employees left the state treasury and were private funds held in
trust for members of the system.).
54. 81 Op. Att'y Gen. 243 (1981) (William J. Guste, Jr., by Ben R. Miller,
Assistant Attorney General).
55. La. R.S. 17:3384 (1982); 93 Op. Att'y Gen. 55 (1993).
56. La. Const. art. VIII, § 10.1 (Louisiana Educational Quality Trust Fund);
La. Const. art. VIII, § 10.2 (Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Fund); La.
Const. art. VIII, § 10.3 (Revenue Stabilization/Mineral Trust Fund); La. Const. art.
VIII, § 10.4 (Higher Education Louisiana Partnership Fund); La. Const. art. VIII,
§ 10.5 (Mineral Revenue Audit and Settlement Fund); La. Const. art. VIII, § 10.6
(Oilfield Site Restoration Fund); La. Const. art. VIII, § 10.7 (Oil Spill Contingency
Fund). Also, La. Const. art. VIII, § 14(B) was amended to make an exception for
the Rockefeller Refuge Trust and Protection Fund and the Russell Sage or Marsh
Island Refuge Fund.
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generated by research projects. Instead, the state's penchant for
loading the constitution with extensive detail exhibited itself, and a
constitutional amendment was adopted to create another exception in
Section 14(B) to allow "acquisition of stock by an institution of
higher education in exchange for any intellectual property."
Section 14(A) is specific in forbidding the state and political
subdivisions to subscribe to orpurchase the stock of a corporation
or association or for any private enterprise. Other forms of subsidy
to private entities are allowed so long as they do not involve a
purchase or subscription to stock. As will be shown later, the state
can construct factories or port facilities and lease them to private
entities. Long term leases have been allowed, putting the state at risk
of loss that is as real as an investment in the entity's equity. In effect,
though limits on stock purchase still exist, so many exceptions have
been allowed and so many alternative devices exist to accomplish
subsidies to private investments that the limits are not accomplishing
what has been their historic purpose.
IV. CREDIT OF THE STATE?
... the credit... of the state or of any political subdivision
shall not be loaned [or] pledged ... to or for any person,
association, or corporation, public or private.
A. Revenue Bonds
In many states, debt limitations on the state and on local
governments simply do not apply to special districts." The Louisiana
Constitution, however, does extend its limits on pledging credit to
political subdivisions, including local special districts. Nonetheless,
the limits on pledging the credit of the state or political subdivisions
have been held to apply only to borrowing supported by the full faith
and credit of the state. Bonds secured by revenue from limited
sources are allowed and are not limited by Section 14(A). The result
in Louisiana is thus similar to that in other states in that constitutional
limitations on borrowing have been circumvented by the issuance of
substantial amounts of revenue bonds. Often in Louisiana, as in other
states, the device used to establish this loophole is the special district.
These entities are established by government, usually for a
specific purpose (such as providing water, drainage, etc.) to perform
57. M. David Gelfand, Seeking Local Government Financialintegrity Through
Debt Ceilings, Tax Limitations, and Expenditure Limits: The New York City Fiscal
Crisis, the Taxpayers'Revolt, and Beyond, 63 Minn. L. Rev. 545 (1979).
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services that could be performed directly by the government. These
entities or authorities do not commit the full faith and credit of the
state or the local government and are ostensibly not using the credit
of the government. They commit their revenues to repayment of
bonds, and the holders of their bonds must be satisfied with that
resource. The cost of this device, arguably, is higher interest rates.5"
As a leading commentator put it in 1958,
Practical politicians, then, would rather support the building
authority device than a repeal or liberalization of the debt
limit. Thus, in circumventing the debt-limit barrier to
desirable public projects Americans have adapted their
institutions to their moral slogans. In the process, they have
paid, and pay, unnecessarily high interest rates-the price of
apparent virtue.59
Federal tax policy, which allowed local bonds of such entities to be
free of federal income tax, also encouraged such governmental
borrowing to support industrial expansion and installation of
pollution control devices.
These devices became common in Louisiana without much
question as to their legality.' Indeed, the federal government
encouraged the use of special districts as part of its PWA depression
era public works projects; the federal government could contract
directly with such districts.6 CC '73 blessed the concept in Article
VI, Section 19, giving the legislature broad powers to establish such
districts and the power to authorize political subdivisions to establish
such districts. Indeed, Article VII, Section 6(C) explicitly allows them
to issue bonds and specifies that "such revenue bonds shall not carry
the pledge of the full faith and credit of the state and the issuance of the
58. Id. at 560.
59. G. Robert Morris, Evading Debt Limitations with Public Building
Authorities: The Costly Subversion of State Constitutions, 68 Yale L.J. 234, 268
(1958).
60.
Article VI, § 19 is in keeping with the national trend recognizing that a
special district is a public agency created or authorized by the Legislature
to aid the state in, or to take charge of, some public or state work, other
than community governent .... The governmental powers of special
substate units may be defined on a functional as well as a geographical
basis, and the size and complexity of the function performed by a special
district may be such as to overlap with the functions and borders of
counties, cities, and, occasionally, state or even international boundaries.
Director of La. Recovery Dist. v. All Taxpayers, 529 So. 2d 384, 389 (La. 1988).
61. Morris, supra note 59. The director of the legal division of the PWA wrote
widely encouraging their use. E.g., E. H., Foley, Jr., Revenue Financing of Public
Enterprises, 35 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1936).
2001]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
bonds shall not constitute the incurring of state debt under this
constitution." The constitution also specifically states that the districts
can be given the power to tax and to incur debt and issue bonds.
Perhaps the most extreme example of treating a special district of
the state as not bound by limits on the state was the statewide taxing
district approach. In Board of Directors of the Louisiana Recovery
District v. All Taxpayers, 2 the supreme court approved a plan whereby
the legislature created a special district covering the entire territory of
the state and allowed it to impose a one-cent sales tax throughout the
state. This device would seem to have been prohibited by Article VII,
Section 2 which requires, for a state tax increase, a two-thirds vote of
the members of both houses. Even though the authority to establish
special districts comes from Article VI on Local Government, the court
reasoned that a statewide district was permitted by Article VI, Section
19. The court also reasoned that the statewide district was not a "local
governmental subdivision' ' 3 and not subject to limits on such
subdivisions. The district, inspired by the device used to ameliorate
New York City's fiscal crisis in the mid-1970s" was allowed to issue
revenue bonds secured by the sales tax it levied, the bonds not being
backed by the full faith and credit of the state. Thus, the agency of the
state was allowed to do what the state qua state could not do.65 Though
the constitution was amended to prevent the legislature from repeating
such legislation, the reasoning of the case and its analysis remains
largely intact. The amendment prohibited granting such powers
without a two-thirds vote to authorities "whose boundary or combined
boundaries are coterminous with the state."' Other special districts are
not covered by the amendment and presumably are allowed.
B. Full Faith and Credit-What It Isn 't
As the previous discussion indicates, the evil sought to be avoided
was state or local governments exercising in favor of private interests
their power to borrow funds supported by a security interest that
extended to all the resources and income of the entities. Incurring
debt supported by bonds would certainly be the classic situation.
Indeed, the law is so clear here that there are few litigated cases
involving the stereotypical state issuance of bonds other than revenue
bonds.
62. 529 So. 2d 384 (La. 1988).
63. Id. at 392.
64. Gelfand, supra note 57.
65. For a critical discussion, see John Devlin, Louisiana Constitutional Law,
49 La. L. Rev. 395, 406 (1988).
66. La. Const. art. VI, § 30.1, adopted by 1994 La. Acts No. 48.
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In one area, however, the concept of debt was limited by the
courts in construing Article VII, Section 6(A) which requires a two-
thirds vote to "incur debt or issue bonds." The court in State Bond
Commission v. All Taxpayers67 made Louisiana's law similar to that
of other states in considering revenue anticipation notes payable
within the fiscal year of issue not to be subject to debt limitations. 68
The court stated that the text of Article VII, Section 6(C) does not
clearly prohibit the issuance of such notes, and though "An
'indebtedness' may be created in one sense but not a 'debt'
historically understood to burden future legislatures and taxpayers
and one which is secured by the full faith and credit of the state. ' 69
The court relied on the argument that debt constitutes a technical term
of art that should be interpreted according to its meaning in the field
of governmental finance.7" The court extended the power of the
legislature to revenue anticipation notes payable in the beginning of
the fiscal year following the year in which they were issued." At the
time of the litigation, the State Bond Commission stated that in 1986,
105 public bodies in Louisiana borrowed a total of $601,538,048 in
anticipation of collecting revenues.72
Although they require substantial future resources, long-term
lease contracts requiring rental payments by the state for several
years are not considered debt and are allowed. The most extreme
example is the financing arrangements for the Louisiana
Superdome.73 The scheme was adopted as part of a constitutional
amendment, but its internal inconsistencies still posed a problem for
67. 510 So. 2d 662 (La. 1987).
68. Gelfand, supra note 57, at 567; Morris, supra note 59, at 242.
69. Gelfand, supra note 57, at 566.
70. See John Devlin, Louisiana Constitutional Law, 48 La. L. Rev. 335, 342
(1987); J.A. Johnson, Note, State Bond Commission v. All Taxpayers of Louisiana:
Revenue Anticipation Notes-Necessary Reform or Portent?, 62 Tul. L. Rev. 1154(1988).
71. State Bond Comm. v. All Taxpayers, 525 So. 2d 521 (La. 1988).
72. Linda Lightfoot, Arguments Filed in Dispute Over Revenue Anticipation
Notes, Baton Rouge Advocate, July 30, 1987, at IA.
73. Stadiums are often the object of contentious public/private arrangements.
In King County v. Taxpayers of King County, 949 P.2d 1260 (Wash.), amending
938 P.2d 309 (Wash. 1997), the court allowed issuance of bonds to provide aid to
the Seattle Mariners because it contained legally sufficient consideration and lacked
donative intent. See Matthew Broderson, Comment, Legislative Branch-Debt
Limits, 30 Rutgers L.J. 1478 (1999) for a commentary on the case and a listing of
other recent litigation in the area. Writing earlier about the Washington caselaw,
a writer concluded, "Over the last thirty years, however, the Washington State
Supreme Court has broadened these formerly narrow exceptions to the point that
few transactions are found unconstitutional." David D. Martin, Washington State
Constitutional Limitations on Gifting of Funds to Private Enterprise: A Need for
Reform, 20 Seattle U. L. Rev. 199 (1996).
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determining full faith and credit. A special district was established
to issue bonds and to use the funds to construct the dome. The
district leased the dome to the state who then contracted with the
district for the management and operation of the arena. The rentals
under a lease of up to 40 years were the sum needed to pay the
bondholders, reduced by the net income from the dome and the
proceeds of a hotel occupancy tax. The court upheld the plan and in
dictum stated its belief that the payment of rentals is not the type of
activity prohibited by the predecessor of Article VII, Section 14.1
4
The 4-3 decision also depended on prior cases that allowed the state
to commit to payments of $5 million to a bridge authority for twelve
years-the plan did not involve the full faith and credit of the state."
The Louisiana position in this regard is consistent with the general
view in the United States, going back to Lord Coke, that rents were
not debts.76
The supreme court took a similar position in a case without the
constitutional amendment complications of the domed stadium case.
In Board of Commissioners of Louisiana Municipal Power
Commission (LAMPCO) v. All Taxpayers,77 municipalities formed a
special commission to issue bonds and to build electric power
generation facilities. They also agreed by contract to buy power from
the commission; the contracts contained "take or pay" clauses that
required the cities to make the payments whether they took the power
or not. The court upheld the agreement, stating that there was no full
faith and credit of the cities pledged to secure the payments.
An unusual (and problematic) case is City of Port Allen v.
Louisiana Municipalities Risk Management Agency, Inc.
78
Legislation authorized political subdivisions to form an association
to provide risk management for them, including pooling contributions
to manage risks, establish self insurance funds and to purchase
insurance. A provision in the statute addressed the problems if
insurance coverage was not adequate; it provided that all fund
members would be liable in solido for claims not paid under the plan.
The supreme court held that the provision was "unconstitutional, null
and void insofar as it purports to impose solidary liability upon local
government subdivisions. '79 No bonds were involved; nor were any
other debt instruments. No existing funds were given to anyone.
74. Arata v. La. Stadium & Exposition Dist., 254 La. 579, 225 So. 2d 362
(1969).
75. Smith v. Ascension-St. James Bridge and Ferry Authority, 241 La. 806,
131 So. 2d 902 (1961).
76. Morris, supra note 59, at 256-57.
77. 360 So. 2d 863 (La. 1978).
78. 439 So. 2d 399 (La. 1983).
79. Id. at 403.
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There was the establishment of a contingent liability of each
association member for the others' worker compensation and tort
claims if the pool arrangement did not pay those obligations. The
court theorized that one city could not be constitutionally compelled
to pay a claim incurred by another municipality. "Any such attempt
by another municipality would be a donation or a gratuity.
Otherwise, it could be a loan. Both are prohibited .... ,,10Perhaps the simplest analysis would be to conclude that this risk
undertaking was a pledge of credit in favor of other municipalities.
But it was not a gratuity. It was part of a comprehensive plan in
which each municipality obtained reciprocal rights from other
municipalities. It is hard to understand the court's suggestion that it
was a donation. It is also difficult to discern the policies supporting
the decision; the anti-corruption policy was not implicated, nor was
there any suggestion that the system established involved substantial
risk of loss as in the case of investment in shaky stock ventures. The
case has not been expanded by the courts. The third circuit in State
v. Davis8 stated, "While the opinion in the case contains some strong
language suggestive of a broad holding prohibiting state agencies
from transferring funds between them even for public purposes, we
do not read the case to be that broad."" In effect, the court focused
on the credit grant instead of the donation analysis. In Davis, the
court allowed the State Department of Health and Hospitals to use
federal aid funds to contract with district attorneys to pay them to
enforce child support orders.
Another problematic issue stemming from the PortAllen analysis
is the court's statement that the constitutional provision is violated
"whenever the state or a political subdivision seeks to give up
something of value when it is under no legal obligation to do so. 83
That statement can make no sense without distorting the meaning of
the words. The state obviously can give up funds to buy things even
though it has no legal obligation to buy the thing. The state can
invoke its credit to borrow money even though it has no obligation to
borrow. Looking at the authorities the court cites to support its
statement, it appears they were not on point, but dealt with
intergovernmental transfers of funds and payment of moving
expenses to owners of expropriated property.84 And of course,
governments can make donations under any of the exceptions stated
80. Id. at 402.
81. 539 So. 2d 803 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989).
82. Id. at 808.
83. PortAllen, 439 So. 2d at401.
84. Town of Brusly v. West Baton RougeParish Police Jury, 283 So. 2d 288
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1973); Beaird-Poulan, Inc. v. La. Dept. of Highways, 362 F.
Supp. 547 (W.D. La. 1973).
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in Section B even if those are discretionary rather than being
compelled. It probably would be simpler to analyze these matters in
the traditional system used by the civil code since before
statehood--donations are transfers based on a gratuitous cause as
opposed to an onerous one.85 The Port Allen risk management
scheme was not based on a gratuity but on a system for uniting to
generate greater leverage to secure insurance and self insurance
management.
The supreme court has since allowed the transfer of funds from
a state college to an alumni federation and thence to a separate alumni
foundation to support the latter's work in aiding the college. 86 These
were discretionary transfers. The funds were transferred and arguably
would meet the Port Allen dictum. But they were allowed,
presumably because they were not gratuitous; they went with the
obligation to use them for university related purposes. In any event,
the Port Allen case seems inconsistent with the general trend.
V. DONATIONS OF STATE PROPERTY
funds... property, or things of value... shall not be...
donated to or for any person, association, or corporation,
public or private.
The constitution does not define the term "donation" and leaves
it open for court construction. Neither are the terms "funds",
"property," or "things of value" defined. The last phrase might call
up the very broad definition of "anything of value" in the Criminal
Code theft provisions. However, there is no indication that it should
be synonymous with the constitutional language. The definition in
the Criminal Code was a 1942 legislative innovation, but the
reference to "things of value" go back to the 1879 Constitution.88 The
85. La. Civ. Code art. 1523:
There are three kinds of donations inter vivos:
The donation purely gratuitous, or that which is made without
condition and merely from liberality;
The onerous donation, or that which is burdened with
charges imposed on the donee;
The remunerative donation, or that the object of which is to
recompense for services rendered.
La. Civ. Code art. 1526: In consequence, the rules peculiar to donations
inter vivos do not apply to onerous and remunerative donations, except
when the value of the object given exceeds by one-half that of the charges
or of the services.
86. Guste v. Nicholls College Foundation, 564 So. 2d 682 (La. 1990).
87. La. R.S. 14:2 (1997).
88. La. Const. art. 56 (1879).
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course of the caselaw has been to give a narrow definition of the term
donation in keeping with the traditional civil code concepts going
back to pre-statehood days. A donation is currently defined as a
gratuitous act, one "which is made without condition and merely from
liberality."89 The following sections examine the evolution of the
decisions in this area. Again, the conclusion will be that the
constitutional limitations are not effectively curbing various types of
aid to private interests. The day of the social welfare state providing
aid to the various types of needy persons and the age of industrial
inducement by states seeking job creation are entrenched.
A. Conditional Transfers to the State
The prohibition against donation of property owned by a public
body would not be violated if the property was initially obtained
subject to a resolutory condition and the condition was fulfilled.
Public ownership would not be complete if subject to the condition,
and it would not be a gratuitous act for title to transfer upon
happening of the condition. In Hero v. City ofNew Orleans, ° private
owners donated land to an airport commission with a provision that
the property would revert to the donors if it ceased to be used as a
public airport terminal. When that use ceased, the resolutory
condition was activated and the property was returned. No violation
of the constitutional prohibition occurred since the property had
initially been acquired with a limitation; the happening of the
condition was not a donation. Neither the anti-corruption aspect of
the prohibition nor the anti-speculative policies were violated. The
state and the public benefitted from the beneficence of private persons
and was able to use the property at no cost for a period of time.
A more difficult case arose in Reaux v. Iberia Parish Police
Jury.91 Private owners sold land to the police jury in 1942, reserving
a right to repurchase the property at the same price if the land ceased
to be used as an airport. The police jury donated the land to the
United States in 1955 for use as a military air station. The United
States, to ensure its title, expropriated the inchoate rights in the land
held by the vendors. When the United States no longer needed the
property, it returned it to the police jury, which sought to develop it
89. La. Civ. Code art. 1523. When the state expropriates private property, it
must compensate the owner "to the full extent of his loss." La. Const. art. I, § 4.
This would include moving expenses in the appropriate case, contrary to some
statements from a pre- 1975 constitution case which suggests that moving expenses
would be an improper donation. See Beaird-Poulan, Inc. v. La. Dept. of Highways,
362 F. Supp. 547 (W.D. La. 1973).
90. 135 So. 2d 87 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
91. 454 So. 2d 227 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
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as an industrial park. At that point, the successors of the vendors
sought to exercise the right to repurchase land then valued at $12,500
per acre, but whose 1942 sale prices were $180 per acre in one case
and $1,840 per acre in another. The court reasoned that the resolutory
condition had been destroyed by the expropriation by the United
States. Hence, the police jury was not bound to return the property
at the cheap price. To do so without being bound to do so would
constitute a donation under Civil Code article 2464 which requires
that a valid sale have a price not out of proportion with the value of
the thing sold.
B. Leases and Use of Property
A facile reading of Section 14 suggests that it does not prohibit
the leasing of state property to private interests. The normal meaning
of "loan" and "pledge" refer to borrowing money, and would not
cover leases. But could a right to use state property be a donation of
a thing of value if title is not transferred? The leading case of State
v. Board. of Commisioners 92 suggests that the leases are permissible.
In that case, the dock board leased a wharf and a warehouse from the
United States when the U.S. apparently would not lease only the
wharf. With no need for the warehouse, the dock board then
subleased it, apparently at market rates, to private persons. The court
found no constitutional violation. It would appear that the anti-
corruption aspects of the prohibition were not invoked here, since the
rental was paid, and that the anti-speculation aspects of the
prohibition were not apparently involved. In such a case, it would
appear that the focus would be on what was paid or exchanged to the
government entity by the lessee.
The early case was relied on in Miller v. Greater Baton Rouge
Port Commission93 to support a much broader governmental
program designed to aid private interests. The port commission
issued tax exempt bonds to build port facilities which were then
leased to private companies. It was argued that the transactions
were in effect a loan of the credit of the state to private individuals
and corporations, but the court instead reasoned that leases of public
property were permitted since they were not donations of state
property in the meaning of the constitutional provision. Here, with
the prices assumed to be at market value, the anti-corruption
policies were not invoked. But given the issuance of bonds for
projects in aid of private business, the anti-speculation policies
could well have been defeated by the outcome. The same analysis
92. 153 La. 664, 96 So. 510 (1923).
93. 74 La. 387, 74 So. 2d 387 (1954).
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was carried forward in Kliebert v. South Louisiana Port
Commission." There the port commission bought riparian property
from a private company, Bayside, issued $8.5 million in tax exempt
bonds to build a grain elevator on the land, and then leased the
elevator for 40 years to Bayside. The court relied on Miller and
allowed the transaction with little discussion. Perhaps the long term
of the lease rendered the transaction less speculative than otherwise,
but the possibility of insolvency of such a company is ever present,
perhaps triggering the concern against use of government funds for
speculative projects.
Use of public property by veterans organizations also has been
allowed with minimal payments. In City ofNew Orleans v. Disabled
American Veterans," the city sought to annul a lease that dated back
to 1933. A special statute had allowed the city to lease or give by
donation surplus buildings or land to the Disabled American Veterans
for veteran relief or club purposes. The DAV leased eight lots on
South Claiborne Avenue, a major thoroughfare, for 35 years with $1
per year rent. The lease agreement required the DAV to keep the
buildings insured, to maintain them, and to assume responsibility for
torts. Despite the nominal rent, the court relied on State v. Board of
Commissioners96 and held that the lease did not violate Article IV,
Section 12 of the 1921 Constitution. The court reasoned that a lease
was not within the meaning of loan, pledge or grant of any fund,
credit or thing of value. The court also concluded that the
consideration for the lease was "serious" and thus the transaction was
not a donation-more than $1 was involved, considering the other
obligations incurred.
The fictions of the DAV case were continued in Arnold v. Board
of Levee Commissioners97 when taxpayers sought to enjoin
construction of museum and library on lakefront property leased from
the defendant levee board. The F. Edward Hebert Foundation, a
private group, planned to build the library named after a prominent
congressman. The annual rent was $1 per acre. The court again
found the "serious consideration" in addition to the payment included
the obligations imposed on the foundation-constructing a building
at a minimum cost of $300,000; design was subject to levee board
approval; the board would obtain ownership at the termination of
lease; the foundation had to maintain and insure the library.
94. 182 So. 2d 814 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
95. 223 La. 363, 65 So. 2d 796 (1953).
96. 153 La. 664, 96 So. 510 (1923).
97. 366 So. 2d 1321 (La. 1978).
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The lone exception in the lease cases was the factually intense
decision in Northeast La. Detachment v. Monroe." A 3.21 acre tract
of park land was leased for 99 years to a veterans organization for $1
and other valuable consideration. The group was required to erect a
building; it released the city from warranty for vices or defects and
assumed liability for damage claims. The property was used by the
group's members for social and civic functions. The court held the
lease was a donation not supported by serious or sufficient
consideration. There was no direct benefit to city or to the public
generally, and there was no obligation to make premises available for
public use. The court sought to distinguish the DA V case, where, it
said, the obligations on the DAV were more substantial.Another element of permissible state largesse to individuals
resulted from oyster lease legislation. Originally, naturally occurring
oysters on the beds of navigable water bodies or the seashore were
things classified as res nullius available to all members of the public.
Asserting its ostensible rights as owner of the waterbeds, the state
withdrew that right from the public, and began leasing oyster growing
sites to individuals at nominal rates. Presumably, this policy
encouraged seeding the areas and lead to greater production. In State
v. Guidry,99 the supreme court determined that such leases did not
violate Article 58 of the Constitution of 1913. It stated that the
transactions were not loaning, pledging or granting of funds of the
state.' 00
: The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, injurisich v. Hopson Marine
Service,'0 took the same approach. There, state oyster leases were
granted for $1 or $2 per acre. Acknowledging that under Louisiana
Civil Code article 2464, a sale at nominal cost would be a disguised
donation, it nonetheless reasoned that when the rent is nominal, other
obligations imposed by the lease may supply the requisite
consideration. The court found "serious consideration." Without
explaining, the court concluded that the obligations incorporated in
the leases were serious, not mere trifles; enacted into law meant they
98. 253 So. 2d 107 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971). Cf Martin, supra note 73, at 201:
"The Washington State Supreme Court has never found donative intent and, thus,
has never scrutinized the adequacy of the consideration exchanged."
99. 142 La. 422, 76 So. 843 (1917).
100. It relied on State v. Authement, 139 La. 1070, 72 So. 739 (1916), where
with little discussion of constitutional issues, the court permitted administration of
the leases and the establishment of the crime of taking oysters from another's lease.
It agreed with the lower court that the state has power to lease such part of natural
oyster reefs as it sees fit and necessary for conservation and development of the
oysters of the state.
101. 619So.2d 1111 (La.App.4thCir. 1993).
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were not intended to be ignored. The court presumed that the
legislature must have determined the obligations were serious.
Though not in the form of a contract of lease, free use of state
property was allowed in State v. Cumberland. 2 It upheld a statute
that provided that telephone companies could place their lines on
public lands at no cost. The court reasoned that such use was not
within the limitation of the 1879 Constitution which referred to loan,
pledge or grant... of funds, credit, property or thing of value of the
state. 0 3 A different meaning would require that useful improvements
would have to stop at every line dividing private from state land.
State v. South Central Bell Telephone Co." upheld a similar statute
in 1993. The state argued that a right of use is sufficient to constitute
a donation of state property. The court maintained a strict
construction, pointing out that the state has not given up control over
the land, and it retained all other ownership rights over the property.
It cited Louisiana Civil Code article 1468 which defines a donation
as an act by which donor divests himself, at present and irrevocably,
of the thing given in favor of the donee. That definition was not met,
since the state retained ownership and the right was not irrevocable.
Presumably, the grant was also in the public interest of providing
utility service to citizens. In other instances, the utilities were granted
the power to expropriate private property to fulfill this public
service.'O05
The ultimate authority in this field involved the state's program
of providing free school books to elementary and high school
students, Huey Long's Free Text Book Act. 'I It was contested in
Borden v. La. State Board of Education,'0 7 in part because of a
violation of Article IV, Section 12 of the 1921 Constitution. The
court allowed the use of funds for that purpose, reasoning that the
books were not donated or granted to the students within the meaning
of the section. The court stated that the program provided for the
loan of books to students, followed by their return. It did not discuss
whether the use itself was something donated or the fact that the
102. 52 La. Ann. 1411, 27 So. 795 (1899).
103. Id. at 1416, 27 So. at 797.
104. 619 So. 2d 749 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
105. La. Const. art. I, § 4 continues to allow the power of expropriation to be
exercised by "any private entity authorized by law to expropriate."
106. 1928 La. Acts No. 100.
107. 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (1929). A companion case was Cochran v. La.
State Bd. of Education, 168 La. 1030, 123 So. 664 (1929), aff'd, 281 U.S. 370,50
S. Ct. 335 (1930). The court allowed the loan of textbooks to students in private
and parochial schools. See 76 Op. Att'y Gen. 1604 (1976) (permissible for
religious school's football team to use public school stadium for football games and
to use public school buses).
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books would be destroyed by their use. Indeed, the Court spoke
broadly of state power,
Where the granting or lending of anything of value, belonging
to the state, or any political corporation thereof, is necessary
in the reasonable exercise of the police power, Section 12 of
article 4 of the Constitution was not intended to prevent the
granting or lending. Were it otherwise, the state, or a
municipal corporation, could not furnish, for instance,
vaccine for the prevention of an epidemic.'°
When a government entity leases property to private interests, it
of course retains ownership of the thing and has rights under the lease
agreement. It may subordinate some of these rights as part of the
administration of the lease. In Department of Culture, Recreation &
Tourism v. Fort McComb Development Corporation,'09 the lessee
mortgaged its leasehold interest to a bank, and the state agency
contractually subordinated its rights to the bank. Later, after the
lessee failed to pay the rent, the state agency sought a determination
that it had no power to subordinate such rights. The court held that
the arrangement did not violate the constitution, stating that the
agency "has not loaned, pledged or granted anything." 0
Presumably, it did give up something of value, as part of an onerous
transaction in which the public benefitted by having a private entity
revitalize a historic site.
C. Gifts to Charities
An early supreme court decision prohibited donation of public
funds to several charitable societies. In State ex rel Orr v. City of
New Orleans,1' the city appropriated $40,200 in 1896 to various
private charities, asylums and homes in what appeared to be
unrestricted grants. The appropriation was contested by a taxpayer
whose children attended public schools that were to be closed early
because of lack of funds. At that time, Article 56 of 1879
Constitution contained the usual language against funds of the city
being granted to private corporations or associations. In a
straightforward analysis of the language, the court held the donations
108. Borden, 168 La. at 1021, 123 So. at 661.
109. 385 So. 2d 1233 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
110. Id. at 1236.
111. 50 La. Ann. 880, 24 So. 666 (1898). Accord: James v. Rapides Parish
Police Jury, 113 So. 2d 88 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1959) (police jury could notpay $750
dues to a civic organization, the Red River Improvement Assn., dedicated to




to societies were not permitted. Chief Justice Nicholl's opinion,
however, suggested that providing direct aid to needy individuals
would be allowed if performed by city employees or by private
societies under contracts that controlled their use of public funds.
Hardin v. City of Shreveport"2 is not a strong constitutional
decision since it rests primarily on statutory construction of local
government powers; nonetheless, it reflects, even in 1933, a narrow
reading of the power to use public funds to provide social services.
The supreme court found that the city had no power to use tax funds
to pay the salary of a "service officer" who would provide advice and
assistance to war veterans. The court cited Article V, Section 12 of
the 1921 Constitution, which prohibited donation of state funds.
However, it relied more on Article X, Section 5, which provided that
the power of taxation of municipalities under authority granted by the
legislature was limited to parish, municipal and local purposes. The
funds here, the court argued, could not be justified on the basis of
benefitting the indigent; the benefit here was not based on economic
status, but was a benefit for a specified class of citizens, namely ex-
servicemen and their dependents. It distinguished cases allowing
direct payment of bonuses to veterans; those were made possible by
state law provisions, not by local governments.
More recently, State ex rel Porterie v. Housing Authority of New
Orleans,1 3 took a more tolerant approach to public welfare
expenditures. A statute authorized a governmental entity, the
Housing Authority of New Orleans, to construct housing and make
it available at low rent to qualified poor persons. The city agreed to
buy $1,050,000 in bonds issued by HANO to pay for the housing.
The supreme court held that Article IV, Section 12 did not prohibit
use of municipal funds for this purpose. Use of funds to protect
health, morals and safety of inhabitants was permissible, and that
purpose was the ultimate use of the funds through another
governmental entity." 4
Of course, CC '73 broadened the scope of permissible state
actions in this area, specifically authorizing in Article VII, Section
14(B) the use of public funds for programs of social welfare for the
aid and support of the needy. No distinction is made between direct
payments to individuals versus grants to organizations that would
serve the needy. More recent cases also take a broader view of
permissible social services. Safety Net for Abused Persons v.
Segura"5 suggests that it is permissible for the state to contract with
112. 178La.46, 15OSo.665(1933).
113. 190La. 710, 182 So. 725 (1938).
114. Id. at 732, 182 So. at 733.
115. 692 So. 2d 1038 (La. 1997).
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a non-profit private corporation to provide counseling and shelter for
victims of domestic abuse. Under the revised Sections 14(B) and (C),
such social welfare programs are permissible. To the extent it was
argued that "needy" in 14(B) should be construed to mean only
"indigent," the court stated in footnote that there was no authority to
support that contention.' 6
D. Benefits to Public Employees
Benefits to government workers have caused difficulty in cases.
Presumably, payments of wages for doing no work would be some
type of violation of the constitutional provision, but drawing the
appropriate line is difficult, as displayed in a number of prosecutions
for theft under the criminal code.""
Perhaps the archetypical case was McElveen v. Callahan,"8 in
which a marshal sued to recover payments made by his predecessor.
The former marshal, about to leave office on December 31, issued
checks to three employees totaling $11,000 for supposedly
performing extra duties and for unpaid overtime. The court, however,
concluded the payments were in fact prohibited bonuses disguised as
compensation for extra services. It relied on Article IV, Section 3 of
the 1921 constitution which specifically stated that the legislature had
no power to grant extra compensation to employees." 9 The force of
McElveen may well have been reduced since the adoption of the 1975
constitution, which did not continue the provisions of Article IV,
Section 3 and instead retains only the provisions of the prior Section
4 in Article VII, Section 14(A). The case was distinguished in
Boneski v. City of Abbeville 2 ° in which the third circuit court of
appeal allowed the city to make "supplemental payments" to attract
applicants to its police department. The payments in effect were
116. But see Hardin v. City of Shreveport, 178 La. 46, 150 So. 665 (1933)
which did, in passing, state that aid to veterans would not meet the test of aid to the
needy, suggesting an economic test.
117. E.g., State v. Fruge, 251 La. 283,204 So. 2d 287 (1967); State v. Gisclair,
382 So. 2d 914 (La. 1980). The broad definition of anything of value in the
criminal code, La. R'S. 14:2, 67 (1997), has not been incorporated in the
constitutional term "things of value."
118. 309 So. 2d379 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
119. The court also relied on Picard which prohibited extra payments to
contractors beyond the contract price and on attorney general opinions which
permit increased salary payments for future services but not for past services.
120. 745 So. 2d 1229 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1999). See also State v. Davis, 539 So.
2d 803 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989) (payments of $42,000 an outgoing district attorney
made to himself were found to be unearned bonuses in violation of Section 14(A);
case is factually intense and may be weak authority).
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salary increases given for future work, rather than retroactive extra
payments for completed work.
An odd scenario occurred in Martin v. State. 2I The plaintiff had
obtained consent to sue the state for worker's compensation benefits
and then obtained a favorable judgment. The state questioned the
amount to be paid, specifically asking for an offset based on the fact
that for twenty-five weeks he was paid his entire wage without
rendering any services. That payment represented a difference of
$5.28 per week above the amount of compensation the state could
be compelled to pay. The state argued that paying the difference
would be making a donation. In similar cases dealing with private
employers, it was held that the excess paid was a gratuity, which the
employer could not recover. From that reasoning, the lower court
concluded that payment of the "gratuity" would violate Article IV,
Section 12. The argument had a facile ring to it, and the court of
appeal rejected it. Acceptance of such an argument by the court
would result in discrimination in favor of the state and against an
injured employee authorized to sue the state. Perhaps more to the
point, Article III, Section 35 provided, as part of regulating suits
against the state; for the manner in which judgment shall be.paid.
Included was the rule that authorized the legislature to establish a
procedure and effect ofjudgments, the court presumably suggesting
that power included making such payments even if not earned.
More typical are recent cases taking a more liberal approach to.
fringe benefits associated with state employment. This approach
would seem to be fortified by the adoption in the 1975 Constitution
of a specific exception allowing "contributions of public funds to
pension and insurance programs for the benefit of public
employees." '122 In Morial v. Orleans Parish School Board,2 3 a
teacher who became ill sued for payments for days missed in excess
of accumulated sick leave days. Louisiana Revised Statutes
17:1201-2 provided for such compensation, but the school board
argued the statute was unconstitutional; it was a salary payment
without corresponding work and thus a gift in violation of Article
IV, Section 12. The court reasoned that the sick leave was designed
as a permissible fringe benefit related to work. "If Appellant's
argument is taken literally then all situations in which a person
received pay for hours or days not actually worked would have to
be struck down as unconstitutional. This would include paid
121. 25So.2d251 (La. App. lstCir. 1946).
122. La. Const. art. VII, § 14(B)(2).
123. 332 So. 2d 503 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
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vacations, minimum sick leave pay and sabbatical leave pay to
name but a few.' '12 4
Morial was followed in Weaver v. Plaquemines Parish School
Board.25 The board had to pay a sum to a teacher despite his taking
excess sick leave. The sum, determined by statute, was the
difference between his (higher) salary and the cost of a substitute
teacher. The court characterized the payment not as a gift, but a
legislatively created benefit earned by virtue of the employment.
Under that theory, it would appear that any bonus or severance
package would be permitted, as is the case in private industry.
Even as late as 1985, the court of appeal in Crist v. Parish of
Jefferson'26 disallowed a type of severance pay or terminal leave
compensation. The parish would pay one month's pay for each year
of service upon termination. With little discussion, the court held
it was either a gratuitous or remunerative donation, and the
constitution makes no distinction between types of donations; it
forbids them all. That language is questionable in any event, for a
remunerative donation is not in fact a gratuitous transfer if the value
of the services given reaches a certain percentage of value of the
property transferred. 27 That court attempted to distinguish Morial
since facts there occurred before the 1975 Constitution, but that
should make little difference since the changes in 1975 were
designed to broaden the exception for employee fringe benefits.
Also, in an opinion in which the constitutional issue was not fully
discussed, and which would be supported on more conventional
statutory construction bases, the court in Bouillion v. City of New
Iberia,' held that retroactive application of more liberal leave rules
for employees was unconstitutional.
A bizarre argument was made in Hays v. La. Wildlife &
Fisheries Commission.129  The plaintiff had been illegally
discharged by the commission and was reinstated after four years of
litigation. The commission resisted payment of back wages on the
ground that such a payment would be a donation. The court
rejected the argument, holding plaintiff was entitled to lost wages,
including automatic step and merit increases he would have been
entitled to if employed. The court supported its conclusions in part
based on the civil service provisions in the constitution, from which
one can infer a right to such payments upon invoking the civil
124. Id. at 505.
125. 627 So. 2d 724 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
126. 470 So. 2d 306 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985).
127. La. Civ. Code art. 1523.
128. 657 So. 2d 397 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1995).
129. 153 So. 2d 562 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
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service procedures for improper dismissal. Plaintiff was entitled to
a mandamus for payment of the judgment.
Williams v. Orleans Parish School Board3 ' also involved a claim
for back wages, which the school board resisted on the grounds that
it was an unconstitutional gratuity. There, the plaintiff was an
instructor in a Junior ROTC program. Under a contract between the
United States Army and the board, the latter was required to pay
plaintiff a minimum sum that depended on military rank. The army
determined that plaintiff was entitled to a promotion earlier than his
actual promotion, and he was retroactively promoted. He sought
back wages based on services already rendered, when he should have
had the higher rank. The court affirmed a judgment for $6,000. The
analysis was sparse, with the court distinguishing McElveen on the
facts and disregarding an opinion of the attorney general, OAG 89-
190, which prohibited retroactive compensation.
Shows v. Morehouse General Hospital' concerned a public
hospital's contract with its director. Under the contract, funds were
paid for pension and insurance programs. The court concluded
simply that the funds were authorized by Article VII, Section 14(B)
as a plan providing deferred compensation. Upon termination of
employment, the plaintiff was entitled to obtain complete control of
an annuity bought with the funds. In Shows, the court did not decide
whether the constitution prohibits severance pay equal to two years
of salary, instead resolving that issue on statutory construction.
E. Revocation of Dedications
Long standing real estate practice allows local governments to
abandon or terminate dedications of streets and parks made by private
persons in favor of the public. Under property law, dedication of
such ownership by private persons is possible and often is mandatory
as part of subdivision development. Normally, the municipality or
police jury acquires ownership of the streets and parks.'33 However,
legislation going back to 1958 in one instance 34 and 1938 in
another' allows setting aside the dedications when the parks or
streets are abandoned or no longer needed for public use. In such a
case, the ownership of the park reverts to the donor; the ownership of
the streets goes to the then contiguous landowners.
130. 560 So. 2d 642 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990).
131. 463 So. 2d 884 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
132. La. R.S. 33:5051 (2000).
133. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Parker, 190 La. 957, 183 So. 229 (1938).
134. La. R.S. 33:4718 (1988).
135. La. R.S. 48:701 (1984).
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Such revocations of dedications in effect allow return of title to
the donor once the public use interest ceases, almost as if the
dedication had been conditioned on continued use as a public place.
Although no compensation is paid by the donors or contiguous
landowners, it may not be analyzed as a simple donation. Indeed, a
literal construction of the terms in Article VII, Section 12 might
characterize a "revocation" as not within the reference to donations,
loans or pledges. It is a special kind of abandonment of rights which
does not implicate the anti-corruption or anti-speculation policies of
the constitutional provision. That such is the custom would seem
supported by thousands of instances in which such revocations have
occurred as a matter of course. It is also supported by dictum in
Emery v. Orleans Levee Board,3 6 where the court stated flatly
without much discussion, "Section 12 of Article IV of the
Constitution [of 1921] is not applicable where property had been
dedicated and set aside for public use."13 7 There, property was made
part of the Bohemia Spillway after being adjudicated to the state for
nonpayment of taxes. An attempt to redeem the property under
existing law was thwarted because of the dedication of the property,
the court reasoning that transfer of the property to a levee board was
not prohibited by the limitation of donation of state funds to a public
corporation.
On the other hand, two questionable cases hint at some
constitutional limitation. Parish of Jefferson v. Noble Drilling
Corporation3 ' is perhaps the easiest to distinguish. There, a
landowner dedicated land for a park in 1910 as part of a subdivision
development. It apparently was used as a park although there
appeared to be no formal acceptance of the dedication. In 1947, the
police jury adopted a resolution stating that the dedication had never
been accepted and thus the land was subject to private ownership.
Then the police jury quit-claimed any right it had in the park in favor
Lockett. In 1949, however, the governing authority rescinded the
1947 resolution and claimed ownership of the property. It appears
that the property had become more valuable due to mineral
production. The supreme court ruled in favor of the parish, holding
that the initial dedication was effective and that the policejury had no
right to renounce and disclaim its title to the park because of Article
IV, Section 12. Perhaps the case could be rationalized because the
city was not entitled to revoke the dedication under the limits of the
statute, or that the 1947 resolution was not a revocation but some
other type of quit-claim or attempted transfer that would be
136. 207 La. 386, 21 So. 2d418 (1945).
137. Id. at399,21 So. at422.
138. 232 La. 981, 95 So. 2d 627 (1957).
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prohibited by the constitutional provision. In any event, the court's
discussion of the constitutional limitation is sketchy and not well
developed.
Also difficult is Boagni v. State.'39 The constitutional claim was
tangential under the facts, namely a claim by a landowner for
compensation for expropriated property. The landowner claimed
ownership of a street on the basis of a revocation of a dedication he
had made earlier. With little discussion, the court stated that upon
substantial compliance with Louisiana Revised Statutes 33:5051, a
statutory dedication occurs and "a local governing authority has no
legal right to disclaim title to them."' 140 The court cited Article VII,
Section 14 and the Noble Drilling case. That quoted statement was.
probably not accurate when made, and certainly not since amendment
of 33:5051 made clear that a developer cannot impose on a,
governmental entity the obligation to accept the dedication and the
burden of maintaining streets that it does not choose to maintain.
Further, if the court were to be taken seriously, there could be no
revocations as provided under Louisiana Revised Statutes 47:701. In
any event, the court's language is dictum, since there had been no
revocation of the dedication. The landowner proceeded on the theory
that the initial dedication was not effective for lack of compliance
with the statute, and the court found instead that there was substantial
compliance resulting in a title transfer.
F. Maintenance of Roads; Servitudes
The prohibition of donations to private interests by local
governments first appeared in the 1879 Constitution.' 4' At that time,
there existed Section 3368 of the 1870 revised statutes, which'
provided that upon maintenance of a private road for three years by
a police jury, the road became subject to public use. Cases applying
the statute determined that the public acquired a servitude interest in
the land. That statute, with slight changes, remains in effect today. 42
Ostensibly, the use of public gravel and the labor of public
workers on maintaining private roads would seem to violate the
constitution. But, if it is done for three years without objection by the
landowner, does it produces a public right? Perhaps this is
Louisiana's equivalent to Mississippi's prohibition of alcoholic
beverages while taxing such beverages at the same time.
139. 399So.2d813(La.App.3dCir. 1981).
140. Id. at 817.
141. La. Const. art. 56 (1879).
142. La. R.S. 48:491 (2000).
2001]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Numerous attorney general opinions conclude that maintenance
of private roads violates Section 14(A), the very volume of such
opinion requests indicating that such local government services in
rural areas are in demand by citizens and popular with politicians.
143
Presumably, there is an element of corruption here in the policy jury
members promoting their re-election with such services. However,
some opinions support an exception to the rule if the maintenance of
a school bus turnaround is involved, even if located on private
property. It is said that supporting school transportation is a
permissible public purpose.'"
At the same time, numerous cases have applied Louisiana
Revised Statutes 48:491 and protected the public right to use such
roads upon proof of the required maintenance. 45 And after three
years of maintenance, the road is public, and this continued
maintenance is not prohibited since it is in pursuance of public
servitudes. 46
In a sense, this problem is a trivial matter and the apparent
inconsistency of the two provisions is not a practical problem. The
constitutional violations go on and the public gets to use the roads
thus maintained. Logic gives way to necessity and the discretion of
prosecutors to worry about more important matters, but the problem
can demonstrate larger concerns and principles.
At the least, it demonstrates that the drafters of the constitutional
provisions over the years must have conceived of the constitutional
prohibition as being a flexible one that would not prohibit such
maintenance. The statute has remained on the books and has been
commonly applied after five constitutional revisions which repeated
the limitations on donations of property to private interests. It is the
basis for courts applying a flexible analysis rather than a rigid
determination of what a donation is and what "things of value" refers
to. In a conventional analysis, reference to other laws co-existing at
the time of the adoption of the limitations would be of use in
determining the extent of the constitutional limits.
143. 00 Op. Att'y Gen. 149 (2000); 99 Op. Att'y Gen. 94 (1999); 9 4 Op. Att'y
Gen. 388 (1994); 89 Op. Att'y Gen. 452 (1989); 83 Op. Att'y Gen. 380 (1983); 82
Op. Att'y Gen. 784 (1982); 81 Op. Att'y Gen. 1223 (1981); 81 Op. Att'y Gen. 942
(1981); 78 Op. Att'y Gen. 1643 (1978); 78 Op. Att'y Gen. 188 (1978); 77 Op.
Att'y Gen. 1023 (1977); 76 Op. Att'y Gen. 649 (1976).
144. 92 Op. Att'y Gen. 120 (1992); 80 Op. Att'y Gen. 1475 (1980).
145. The leading cases are collected in Lee Hargrave, Louisiana Civil Law
Property: Cases & Materials 24-27 (Law Center Publications Inst. of the LSU Law
Center 1996).
146. 92 Op. Att'y Gen. 811 (1992) (if road made public by three year




Going further, the fact that the state or local government acquires
some property rights-a servitude-in return for the expense it has
incurred suggests that the expense is not a donation. At least after the
period is complete, the state acquires something in exchange for its
expenses, suggesting an onerous transaction rather than a donation. 47
Perhaps it becomes overly rigorous to characterize this in doctrinal
terms as a condition being fulfilled and retroactively justifying the
conduct. But there is the acquisition of some kind of inchoate right
with each expenditure, a right that does become a servitude. Perhaps
the corruption aspect of the policy is lessened if the public is gaining
some rights in the process. If the local authorities were to
discriminate against some citizens by withholding benefits because
of political views, the persons harmed could invoke Article I, Section
3 which prohibits discrimination based on "political ideas or
affiliations."
Another possible argument in support of such public expenditures
is an analogy to Article VI, Section 24 which allows the public,
represented by local governments, to "acquire servitudes of way by
prescription in the manner prescribed by law." Granted that
Louisiana Revised Statutes 48:491 is not termed as a prescriptive
period, it nonetheless requires a type of activity over time as in the
case of acquisitive prescription.
G. Aid to Private and Parochial Schools
Public education, of course, is a basic duty of the state, and the
1975 Constitution contains Article VIII, which mandates and
regulates public education from elementary schools to universities.
Certainly, free public schooling was contemplated.
Private school students were also contemplated as beneficiaries
of the state's largesse, and aid to them is not a prohibited donation.
Any state aid to private schools would have to meet the test of Article
VII, Section 10(D) that "No appropriation shall be made except for
a public purpose." The constitution suggests that school aid is a
permissible purpose. Indeed, Article VIII, Section 13 mandates the
legislature provide aid to school children: "The legislature. shall
appropriate funds to supply free school books and other materials of
instruction ... to the children of this state at the elementary and
secondary levels." That language in Section 13(A), which refers to
aid to children, rather than to schools, was designed to include
children attending private schools. This intent is confirmed in the
147. See 92 Op. Att'y Gen. 811 (1992); 78 Op. Att'y Gen. 425 (1978) (police




contrasting reference in Section 13(B) to funding a minimum
foundation program in "public elementary and secondary schools."
A subsequent constitutional amendment creating a trust fund for
support of education states that one permissible use of funds from the
trust is the support of "research efforts of public and private
universities in Louisiana."'4
CC '73 changed the religion clauses of the 1921 Constitution to
allow more flexibility in aid to parochial schools. Article I, Section
8 simply paraphrases the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution, "No law shall be enacted respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." The provision was
adopted by a 104-0 vote, with little debate and with no amendments
submitted, and with the knowledge that it was deleting the 1921
provisions which were more stringent and more precise in prohibiting
use of state money for parochial schools. 149
The provisions of the previous constitution prohibiting aid to
religious schools were quite specific and reiterated in three separate
articles. In addition to a general provision in the Bill of Rights, 50
Article IV, Section 8 prohibited appropriations "directly or indirectly,
in aid of any church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid of any
priest, preacher, minister or teacher thereof .... ." Article XII, Section
13 also stated that no public funds could be appropriated to "any
private or sectarian school." All three provisions were relied on by
the Louisiana Supreme Court in Seegers v. Parker,5' which held
unconstitutional legislation providing grants to teachers of secular
subjects in church schools. The delegates chose not to continue this
unique approach and instead opted to follow the federal constitutional
pattern. The controlling federal constitutional authority at the time,
Lemon v. Kurtzman" and Tilton v. Richardson,153 were well-known
and discussed during CC '73 and seemed to provide an acceptable
solution to the problem of state aid.
Debate on the section occupies a meager two pages in the
transcript of the proceedings. Delegate Gerald Weiss, in introducing
the committee proposal, specifically referred to the standards of
Lemon and Tilton:
148. La. Const. art. VII, § 10.1 (D)(a). The failure to use that "public and
private" formula in the companion paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) suggests that those
other categories of grants cannot be extended to private universities.
149. VI Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973:
Convention Transcripts at 1126-27 (Sept. 6, 1973). The standards of the federaljurisprudence were expected to be continued. Id.
150. La. Const. art. I, § 4 (1921).
151. 256 La. 1039, 241 So. 2d 213 (1970).
152. 403 U.S. 602,91 S. Ct. 2105 (1971).
153. 403 U.S. 672, 91 S. Ct. 2091 (1971).
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[T]he court applies two guidelines, it's my understanding, in
dealing with religious and secular matters. First is, a law or
program must have a secular purpose neither advancing nor
inhibiting religion in making decisions in this regard.
Second, it must not involve the government-federal, state or
local governments-with excessive entanglement with
religion. 154
The impact of the adoption of the proposal and the deletion of the
more explicit sections of the prior constitution is to provide a more
flexible standard with regard to government aid to religion than was
provided in the old document.' 5 The federal limits on aid have
recently been liberalized by the United States Supreme Court. In
Mitchell v. Helms,156 a case arising in Louisiana, the court expanded
the range of permissible aid, extending it to materials and equipment
including library books, computers, computer software, slide and
movie projectors, overhead projectors, television sets, tape recorders,
VCR's, projection screens, laboratory equipment, maps, globes,
filmstrips, slides, and cassette recordings. Presumably, the state
courts will be guided by the federal standards in construing the state
provisions, as the purpose of the constitutional change was to adopt
the federal standard.'5"
VI. COOPERATIVE PROJECTS
In the 1923 case of Union Sulphur Co. v. Parish of Calcasieu,'58
Justice Dawkins concluded it was permissible to use tax funds of a
local government to contribute to a federal project to build a
navigation canal, the Intracoastal Waterway. The court agreed that
the government of the United States was not considered a corporation
within the language of the constitution prohibiting donations to
corporations, public or private. He added that in expending funds for
such a project,
154. VI Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973:
Convention Transcripts at 1127 (Sept. 6, 1973).
155. See Victor A. Sachse, Jr., Article VIII: Does it Change the Status Quo?,
21 Loy. L. Rev. 1123 (1975).
156. 530 U.S. 793, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000).
157. Writing for the 4-3 majority in Seegers v. Parker, Justice Barham noted the
similarity of Article I, Section 4 of the 1921 constitution to the federal guarantee
and said the court would be guided by United States Supreme Court decisions
construing that amendment. 241 So. 2d 213, 216-17 (1970). An Opinion of the
Attorney General stated it was permissible for a religious school's football team to
use public school stadiums for football games and to use public school buses. 77
Op. Att'y Gen. 153 (1977).
158. 153 La. 857, 96 So. 787 (1923).
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the parish is not donating, lending or granting anything to the
federal government, within the meaning of this article,
although great advantage may accrue to it in the way
indicated. The government merely becomes the agent,
perforce of circumstances, of the parish for the
accomplishment of an undertaking which the parish itself
could not fully or conveniently perform. 5 9
When CC '73 was deliberating, the concern of the Committee on
Revenue, Finance and Taxation was the other side of federal state
cooperation-allowing state and local governments to meet the
conditions and commitments attached to the growing level of federal
aid to them. As stated earlier, the committee had proposed the
language of what is now Section 14(C) as an exception to the general
limitation of Section 14(A). The convention moved the language to
a separate paragraph so that the general rule could not be defeated
simply by having an agreement between government agencies or with
private interests. 60 Still, the language is clear in allowing agreements
between state governmental entities with each other, with the federal
government and with private interests. The simple limiting factor, in
addition to Section 14(A), is that the cooperative agreements must be
for a "public purpose."
Even though the history of Section 14(C) indicates that
cooperative agreements involving governmental entities are not
exempt from the limits of Section 14(A), it is nonetheless clear that
such agreements with private associations are permitted and
encouraged. There is some far reaching language in that regard in the
case of Guste v. Nicholls College Foundation.'6' The college
collected fees from students, after approval of the fee in a student
referendum, designated for the Nicholls Alumni Federation, a
nonprofit corporation. The money was placed in the general
operating account of the university and transferred to the federation
in one lump payment each semester. It would follow, as the court
then concluded, that these were public funds in the control of a state
college. The court then concluded that it was permissible for the
159. Id. at 883, 96 So. at 796.
160. City of Port Allen v. Louisiana Mun. Risk Management Agency, Inc., 439
So. 2d 399, 402 (La. 1983). The court stated:
Section 14(C) does not help the state, either. There is no indication that
it is meant to be an exception to the rule of § 14(A); the exceptions are
clearly contained in § 14(B). Thus, even if political subdivisions
cooperate for a public purpose, they still may not give away their assets
to other political subdivisions, the United States government or public or
private associations or corporations, to individuals merely for a "public
purpose."
161. 564 So. 2d 682 (La. 1990).
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college to transfer funds to the federation in pursuit of public
purposes. In addition, the federation transferred some of the funds to
a separate entity, the Nicholls College Foundation, a separate
nonprofit entity. The court reasoned that the foundation's purpose
was to promote the university's interests, so "We can, therefore,
assume that the transmission from the Federation to the Foundation
was in furtherance of the Federation's discharging its constitutional
or legal duties of furthering public education; i.e., it must have been
given by the Federation in pursuit of the Federation's legally
endowed goals."' 62
The court also stated that the transaction "constitutes a transfer of
public funds (rather than simply a donation which is prohibited by La.
Const. art. 7, § 14(A))." 63 Because the objectives of the Federation,
the Foundation and the University coincide in the furtherance of a
governmental purpose, and because a simple donation would be
illegal under Louisiana Constitution article 7, Section 14(A), we find
that the money was given and accepted "under authority of the
constitution and the laws of this state" in furtherance of a
governmental purpose164 It was not a donation in the sense
contemplated by Louisiana Constitution article 7, Section 14(A).' 65
Presumably, the money was being spent for the same educational
purposes for which the college would have spent it, and thus the
college was doing indirectly what it could do directly, much as in the
Segura case.
166
State v. Davis67 approved agreements between district attorneys
and the Louisiana Department of Health and Human Services to
implement a federally funded program to assist in enforcing child
support obligations. The agreements included payment of additional
compensation to the district attorneys for their participation in the
program. In the same way, the attorney general has suggested that
district attorneys could transfer funds to public schools in cooperative
162. Id. at 688.
163. Id. See Seghers v. Community Advancement, Inc., 357 So. 2d 626, 627
(La. App. 1 st Cir. 1978) (transfer of public funds to a nonprofit private entity to use
in anti-poverty programs).
164. The language here seems to repudiate the dictum expressed in City of Port
Allen v. Louisiana Mun. Risk ManagementAgency, Inc., 439 So. 2d 399 (La. 1983)
that a donation occurs whenever the state or a political subdivision seeks to give up
something of value when it is under no legal obligation to do so. See the text in
Part III.
165. Guste, 564 So. 2d at 688.
166. Safety Net for Abused Persons v. Segura, 692 So. 2d 1038 (La. 1997)
(government agency could contract with a non-profit private corporation to provide
counseling and shelter for victims of domestic abuse).
167. 539 So. 2d 803 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989).
1752001]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
activities, "such as law enforcement, drug education and crime
prevention.' 16
The court's language in Nicholls, however, seems quite broad,
perhaps too much so. John Devlin and David Hilbun suggest, "The
court's construction of the constitutional term 'donation' as not
including 'transfers' in furtherance of shared purposes follows current
developments in this and other states, the general tendency of which
has been to loosen restraints on the mechanisms by which public
bodies may use public funds for public purposes."' 69 They conclude,
"Nonetheless, unless limited by future cases, this construction may
create an expansive exception to the constitutional prohibition of La.
Const. art. VII, § 14.' ' 170 But it does appear acceptable if the
interposed entity obtaining the funds uses them for purposes for
which the governmental entity could use them. In such a case, the
transfer will be allowed.
Given the breadth of the extent of this cooperation, it is surprising
that legislators thought there was a need for the last two constitutional
amendments that were adopted to allow donations. Section 14(B)(9)
now permits the state to donate asphalt which has been removed from
state roads and highways to parishes or municipalities pursuant to a
cooperative endeavor.'7 ' A new Section 14(E) was also adopted to
state, "Nothing in this Section shall prevent the donation or exchange
ofmovable surplus property between or among political subdivisions
whose functions include public safety."' 72 Again, the Louisiana
constitutional pattern proves that detail breeds more detail.
VII. WHO Is LIMITED? WHAT IS THE STATE? WHAT IS A
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE?
The structure of Section 14 indicates that the three
limitations-on stock investments, on donations and on pledging
credit-apply to the "state" and to a "political subdivision" of the
state." As the discussion up to this point discloses, substantial aid
in the form of donations and credit to private entities is possible under
the various exceptions provided for in the constitution and in the
168. 99 Op. Att'y Gen. 398 (2000).
169. Hargrave, The Louisiana State Constitution, supra note 49, at 130-31.
170. John Devlin & David Hilburn, Louisiana Constitutional Law, 52 La. L.
Rev. 575, 578 n.13 (1992).
171. 1999 La. Acts No. 1396, § 1.
172. 1999 La. Acts No. 1395, § 1.
173. The 1845 Constitution simply limited the state, but subsequent
constitutions expanded the limitations to include the state and political
corporations. See La. Const. arts. 113, 121 (1845); La. Const. art. 56 (1879); La.
Const. art. 58 (1898); La. Const. art. 58 (1913); La. Const. art. 4, § 12 (1921).
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caselaw. With those doctrines available, the courts have not been
required to elaborate in depth on the exact meaning of the terms state
and political subdivision. But that issue is still a relevant one, for if
some agency is not the state or a political subdivision of the state, it
is not limited by Section 14.
The reference to apolitical subdivision of the state is essentially
a straightforward reference to local governments. As defined in
Article VI (Local Government), the narrower term "[1]ocal
governmental subdivision"' means a parish or a municipality, but
"political subdivision" is a broader term including a parish or
municipality, but also "any other unit of local government, including
a school board and a special district, authorized by law to perform
governmental functions."'' Virtually'all special districts established
by cities and municipalities are thus covered.' The definition can
also encompass, surprisingly, some special districts with statewide
application. The supreme court allowed the legislature to establish
under Article VI, Section 19 the statewide Recovery District with the
power to impose a statewide sales tax and use the proceeds to pay off
bonds that were sold to finance a state deficit. In Board ofDirectors
ofthe Louisiana Recovery District v. All Taxpayers,'76 the court stated
that such a district "is a valid political subdivision and that it may be
granted the power to tax."' 77 A power generating authority providing
services in many parts of the state was found to be a political
subdivision and its property was not subject to ad valorem taxation.
7 8
The simple reference to the state, however, raises a more complex
issue, primarily whether it means only the state qua state or also
includes some or all state agencies and corporations. The reference
in Article VII, Section 14 to the state and in Article XII, Section 13
to the state in granting immunity against the running of prescription,
and to the state in Article I, Section 4, right to property, contrasts
with the many other references that suggest the term state does not
include all state agencies. Consider the following contrasting
174. La. Const. art. VI, § 44. Public Housing Admin. v. Housing Authority of
Bogalusa, 242 La. 519, 137 So. 2d 315 (1961) held that a local housing authority
was subject to the prohibition of investment in stock. James v. Rapides Parish
Police Jury, 113 So. 2d 88 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1959) held that a parish police jury
was limited by the section. Varnado v. Hosp. Ser. Dist. No. 1, 730 So. 2d 1066
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1999) applied the limitations to a local hospital service district
in Assumption Parish.
175. However, a municipality or a board could contract some of its functions
to a private non-profit organization, as in the case of the Audubon Park Zoo. See
Gregory Roberts, Ron Forman: His Animal Kingdom, The Times-Picayune, July
3, 1994, at A1.
176. 529 So. 2d 384 (La. 1988).
177. Id. at 388.
178. Slay v. La. Energy & Power Authority, 473 So. 2d 51 (La. 1985).
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language that appears in the document in Article XII, Section 10,
"Neither the state, a state agency, nor apolitical subdivision shall be
immune from suit . . . ." Variants of that formula appear in the
constitution at least 13 times.'79 The implication of these references
is that some state entities, such as boards and commissions and
agencies, are not included in the reference to the state. Otherwise, the
drafters would simply have referred to the state in all of these
instances. Perhaps the argument is overly technical and assumes too
much consistency in drafting, but nonetheless it is there.
The courts in applying the immunity from prescription have long
distinguished between the state and its agencies. The supreme court
stated that liberative prescription would run against the Board of
Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans in a claim against a ship
tfr damages to a wharf.80  It recently held that the Louisiana
Department of Highways, established by law as a corporate body,
"cannot claim the constitutional immunity from prescription, since it
cannot be characterized as the 'State' for that purpose. ' A court of
appeal determined that even though the Governor's Special
Commission on Education Services was not itself a body politic or a
body corporate,
it is, however, a part of the Department of Education, under
LSA-R.S. 36:642(D)(2), and the Department of Education is
a body corporate with the power to sue and be sued.
179. "state, its agencies, and political subdivisions," La. Const. art. III, § 11; "the
state, a political corporation, or political subdivisions," La. Const. art. V, § 16; "by
the state, or any board, department, or agency of the state," La. Const. art. VII, §
2.1; "state shall have no power, directly or indirectly, or through any state board,
agency, commission, or otherwise, to incur debt," La. Const. art. VII, § 6; "by the
state, directly or through any state board, agency, or commission, or by any
political subdivision of the state," La. Const. art. VII, § 8; "by a state board,
agency, or commission," La. Const. art. VII, § 9(6); "the state, its agencies, boards,
commissions, and political subdivisions and their agencies," La. Const. art. VII, §
17; "state, or any instrumentality thereof," La. Const. art. X, § 1; "of the state and
its political subdivisions," La. Const. art. X, § 21; "state of Louisiana or any
instrumentality or political subdivision thereof," La. Const. art. X, § 29. 1; "state,
a state agency, nor a political subdivision," La. Const. art. XII, § 10; "all state
administrative and quasi-judicial agencies, boards, and commissions," La. Const.
art. XII, § 14.
180. Board of Comm'rs of Port of New Orleans v. Toyo Kisen Kaisha, 163 La.
865, 113 So. 127 (1927).
181. State through the Department of Highways v. City of Pineville, 403 So. 2d
49, 53 (La. 1981). The court cited Board of Cmm'rs of Tensas Basin Levee Dist.
v. Earle, 169 La. 565, 125 So. 619 (1929) (levee districts could not claim immunity
from liberative prescription); Board of Comm'rs of Caddo Levee Dist. v. Pure Oil
Co, 167 La. 801, 120 So. 373 (1929) (same rule applied in case of acquisitive
prescription); Haas v. Board of Comm'rs of Red River, Atchafalaya and Bayou
Boeuf Levee Dist., 206 La. 378, 19 So. 2d 173 (1944).
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LSA-R.S. 36:642(A). Like the Department of Highways in
the City of Pineville case, the Department of Education is a
distinct legal entity subject to claims of prescription. As part
of the department, therefore, the Commission must be
considered amenable to prescription. 1
82
The same rule was extended to the Department of Wildlife and
Fisheries'83 and recently reiterated as to levee districts.
18 4
It would thus appear, based on textual inferences and the caselaw
under a similar use of language, that the rule of Section 14 does not
extend the meaning of state to these entities. The policy reason for
such a conclusion is less clear. Perhaps it is that most true state
agencies operate only upon appropriations from the legislature and
that in practice there is little discretion to spend the money other than.
according to the use prescribed in the appropriation. Also, as the
function of government has come to include social welfare and
education services to citizens, the scope of the limitation should be
narrowed so long as the corruption policies and risk to state credit are
not implicated.
There is little case law involving the meaning of"state" in Section
14. Presumably this is because the issue has been subsumed in other
issues that have allowed agencies to act. Particularly with respect to
issuing bonds, even if the state or an agency is involved, revenue
bonds that do not carry the full faith and credit are allowed and thus
the argument about the meaning of state has not arisen.
In the context of investment in stocks, a court of appeal has held
that a state agency administering pension funds was not limited by
the section. The money transferred from the state to the pension
fund, the court stated, were no longer stated funds controlled by
Section 14.185 This outcome subsists even though some such agencies
may be public bodies for ethics or other purposes. But they are not
the "state." This approach, only partly policy driven, would result in
substantial flexibility and in enormous sums of money in pension
funds and other funds being outside the limits of the constitution.
Also, it would seem that these agencies are not bound by the
limitation on donations. They could, of course, be so bound by
statutes.
182. State Through Governor's Special Comn'n on Educ. Servs. v. Dear, 532
So. 2d 902, 905 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988).
183. T. L. James & Co. v. Kenner Landing, Inc, 550 So. 2d 1378 (La. App. 5th
Cir.1989).
184. Plaquemines Parish Comm'n Council v. Delta Dev. Co., 486 So. 2d 129
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1986).
185. Louisiana State Employees' Retirement Sys. v. State of La. Through Dept.
of Justice, 423 So. 2d 73 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982), writs denied, 427 So. 2d 1206(1983).
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The education boards that govern universities could well be
excluded from the meaning of state or political subdivisions of the
state. They are considered as public corporations. 8 6 Article VIII,
Sections 6 and 7 of the constitution establish the education boards as
"a body corporate." Caldwell Bros. v. Board of Supervisors,8 held
that LSU could issue bonds without violating Article IV, Section 12
of the 1921 constitution. The court stated,
The purpose of this article was not to hamper state agencies
or boards in the exercise of their property functions, or in the
conduct of their legitimate affairs, but to put an end to the
practice of the Legislature to pledge the credit of the state to
aid private enterprises.
Of course, in that case, it was LSU's credit that was at stake and
LSU's obligation to repay, not the obligation of the state. Also
problematic is the recent amendment to Section 14(B) to allow
"acquisition of stock by an institution of higher education in
exchange for any intellectual property." Presumably some drafters
thought that higher education institutions were limited by Section
14(A).
State ex rel Porterie v. Charity Hospital of Louisiana's allowed
the hospital entity to issue bonds. The court reasoned that the bonds
were not obligations of the state, but of the administrators of the
hospital. It relied on earlier cases applying the same rules to levee
districts. 89 These cases reflect Louisiana following the conventional
186. La. Const. art. VIII, §§ 6 & 7 establish the boards as "a body corporate."
See State ex rel Guste v. Nicholls College Found., 592 So. 2d 419 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1991), on remand after 564 So. 2d 682 (La. 1990) (foundation not a public
body for purposes of the public records statute, La. R.S. 44: I(A)(1) but the state
had a right to inspect records of public funds received by the foundation); Caldwell
Bros. v. Board of Supervisors of La St. Univ. & Agr. & Mech. College, 176 La.
825, 147 So. 5 (1933) (LSU could issue bonds without violating Article IV, Section
12 of the 1921 constitution: "The purpose of this article was not to hamper state
agencies or boards in the exercise of their property functions, or in the conduct of
their legitimate affairs, but to put an end to the practice of the Legislature to pledge
the credit of the state to aid private enterprises") (citing Benedict v. City of New
Orleans, 115 La. 645, 39 So. 792 (1905) (permissible to use state and local funds
to construct courthouse for Orleans Parish)).
187. 176 La. 825, 147 So. 5 (1933).
188. 182 La. 268, 161 So. 606 (1935).
189. Excelsior Planting & Mfg. Co. v. Green, 39 La. Ann. 455, 1 So. 873 (1887)
(state could establish levee districts which could issue bonds that were not a debt
of the state.); Fisher v. Steele, 39 La. Ann. 447, 1 So. 882 (1887); Board of Cmnmr's
of Caddo Levee Dist. v. Pure Oil Co., 167 La. 801, 120 So. 373 (1928); Board of
Cmnmr's of Tensas BasinLevee Dist. v. Earle, 169 La. 565, 125 So. 619 (1929);
Richardson & Bass v. Board of Levee Cumr's of the Orleans Levee Dist., 231 La.
299, 1 So. 2d 353 (1956); but see Picard Const. Co. v. Board of Cmnmr's of Caddo
(Vol. 62
LEE HARGRA VE
approach of most states in permitting various entities to issue revenue
bonds that do not have the full faith and credit of the state behind
them. The cases may be distinguished on the grounds that the
rationale supporting their result is that the bonds were not full faith
and credit instruments and permitted on that ground rather than on the
ground they were issued by entities that were not the state. Indeed,
in one old case, Picard Construction Company v. Board of
Commissioners Of Caddo Levee District,90 the court stated in dictum
that the levee district could not donate property, although other cases
allowed it to issue bonds. That case, however, is not strong authority,
for it also relied on another constitutional provision then in existence
which prohibited paying "extra compensation" to .a contractor beyond
the contract price.' 9' That language was not carried into the 1975
Constitution.
VIII. CONCLUSION-MORE AMENDMENTS AND BUREAUCRATIC
SOLUTIONS
As stated earlier, the 1845 and 1852 constitutions sought to limit
the bonded debt of the state to $100,000. Inflation, of course, would
make such attempts unworkable, as similar attempts in other states
failed. "'92 The 1974 Constitution did not include such a limitation on
the total aggregate amount of state debt, neither as a maximum sum
nor as a percentage of state revenues. A basic problem with such
limitations is lack of flexibility on the one hand if simple limits are
imposed, and a problem of complexity on the other if some legislative
flexibility is allowed.'93
Louisiana's fiscal crisis in the late 1980's and early 1990's
resulted in high interest rates on state bonds and an unacceptably high
general obligation debt load. The Public Affairs Research Council
reported that 1987-88 debt service on general obligation bonds,
Levee Dist., 161 La. 1002, 109 So. 816 (1926) (dictum that levee district could not
donate property). The court in McElveen v. Callahan, 309 So. 2d 379 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1975), cited Picard in holding that a local marshal could not give end of
term payments beyond salary because they were donations. However, McElveen
involved what was clearly a local officer of a political subdivision.
190. 161 La. 1002, 109 So. 816 (1926).
191. "The Legislature shall have no power to grant or authorize any parish or
municipal authority to grant any extra compensation, fee or allowance to a public
officer, agent, servant, or contractor .... " La. Const. art. IV, § 3 (1921); La. Const.
art. 47 (1898); La. Const. art. 45 (1879).
192. Heins, supra note 2, at 9-11.
193. The perils of such provisions is illustrated in the lengthy and complex
provisions of the Hawaii Constitution, Article VII, Section 13, adopted in 1968 and
then amended in 1978.
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$388,610,000, was 10.02 percent of general fund revenues. 94 This
sum represented an increase from $91.6 million or 4.6 percent in
1976-77. The high level of debt resulted in downgrading of the
state's credit rating by bond rating agencies. In April 1986, Standard
and Poor's lowered the state's bonds from "AA" to "A."'195
A mini constitutional convention in 1992 sought to revise Article
VII on revenue and finance, including establishing limits on debt.
Numerous complex changes were presented to the voters by the
convention as one proposal, which was rejected. Parts of the proposal
were recycled and adopted as statutes in 1993.'96 The essence of
those statutes were also proposed as constitutional amendments and
adopted in 1993. Section 6(F), added to Article VII, exhibits the
extent of the complexity that is needed to obtain some kind of
limitation, but still leave room for legislative initiatives to exceed the
limits by two-thirds vote.
Section 6(F) limits apply to general obligation bonds and not to
revenue bonds, which can continue to be issued as before.
While it can be stated with certainty that the amount of bond
service allowed in a year cannot exceed 6 percent of the state's
revenues, such a statement begs the question of which bonds are
covered and how the state's revenues are to be determined.
Addressing the first matter, the section leaves the determination of
"net state tax supported debt" to be defined by law, rather than
defined in the constitution. 97 But, to limit the legislature somewhat
to the definition provided by the "reform" legislature that proposed
the amendment, it is provided that the definition can be changed only
by two-thirds vote of each house of the legislature.
The amount of revenues estimated for a year and the
determination of 6 percent of that sum is left to The Revenue
Estimating Conference, a four person committee which by virtue of
Article VII, Section 10 is composed of the governor (or his designee),
the president of the senate (or his designee), the speaker of the house(or his designee) and a faculty member of a university or college in
Louisiana with expertise in forecasting revenues. 98
Also, to avoid a drastic reduction in the amounts of bonds
allowed, the amendment also provided that the 6 percent figure is to
194. Public Affairs Research Council, Special Report #4: Financing Louisiana's
Future 1, Feb. 1988, at 1.
195. Id. at 4.
196. 1993 La. Acts No. 813.
197. La. R.S. 39:1367(E)(2)(a) (Supp. 2000) defines net state tax supported
debt.
198. La. Const. art. VII, § 10(A) allows changes beyond the four members by
a law enacted by 2/3 vote of each house.
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be applied only after 2003-2004, and that a gradual transition to that
goal is made.199
Once the determination is made as to the amount in bonds that
can be issued in a given year, the legislature can still override the
limit by "passage of a specific legislative instrument" adopted by 2/3
vote of each house.
Little difficulty has arisen in application of these provisions
during recent good financial times, and the state's bond rating has
improved. The constitutional scheme has yet to be tested. Indeed,
under current political leadership, the aim has been to issue less
general obligation debt than the allowable constitutional limit. The
State Bond Commission has a working rule that limits the annual
issuance of general obligation bonds to $200,000,000 absent "a
showing of demonstrated special circumstances and need."200 The
current limit on debt service for the fiscal year ending in June 2001
is 6.6 percent, but the actual percentage for that year is 5.2 percent. 0 '
Per capita debt has decreased from $1,097 in 1991 to $555 in 1999.02
All of this more a result of political will than of a constitutional
limitation.
199. La. R.S. 39:1367(A)(1) (Supp. 2000) established a sliding scale moving
from a 13.1 percent limitation in 1993-94 to 6 percent in 2003-04 and subsequent
years.
200. State Bond Commission, Status Report: Net Tax Supported Debt 2 (Apr.
13, 2000).
201. Id. at 3.
202. Id. at 4.
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